Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
Volume 8 2016--A Year of Big Change

Article 6

December 2016

What Factors Affect the Time It Takes To Negotiate Faculty
Collective Bargaining Agreements?
Daniel J. Julius
New Jersey City University, danjjulius@gmail.com

Nicholas DiGiovanni Jr.
Morgan, Brown & Joy, ndigiovanni@morganbrown.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba
Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, and the Higher Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Julius, Daniel J. and DiGiovanni, Nicholas Jr. (2016) "What Factors Affect the Time It Takes To Negotiate
Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreements?," Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy: Vol. 8,
Article 6.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.58188/1941-8043.1649
Available at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol8/iss1/6

This Practitioner Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at The Keep. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy by an authorized editor of The Keep. For
more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

Julius and DiGiovanni: Factors That Effect Time to Negotiate a Faculty CBA

What Factors Affect The Time It Takes To Negotiate Faculty
Collective Bargaining Agreements?
Daniel J. Julius1 and Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr.2

Introduction
This essay endeavors to answer two straight-forward but complex questions: how much
time does it take to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement covering faculty in postsecondary institutions, and what factors influence in the length of time involved? Are there any
responses which will make sense? Can we offer any guidance? Permit first a few anecdotal
stories and then a discussion about the internal and external factors that inform the answer to
these questions and why the best answer may well be, “it depends.”
In the early 1980’s when one of the authors was associated with a large state university
system, a first-time faculty contract was bargained in three days. Impossible? Here’s the reason
why that could possibly happen. A negotiator and a senior administrator then in charge
determined to wrap up the settlement “in principle” because, among other reasons, they were not
supportive of the person who was about to come in as the new vice president responsible for all
human resources and labor relations. Sparing the reader the names and details to avoid any
untoward reactions, these two individuals, “collaborated” with a bargaining agent representative
in a manner which they thought would conclude a deal, solidify “their” positions in the system,
and exclude the new vice president from the important decisions going forward.
There were other mitigating circumstances to the story as well. For example, this was the
first set of negotiations for this state system, and there were many political and variable
dynamics between the campuses and the system office. In any event, the outline of an entire
initial contract was set forth in principle on a single piece a paper. The new vice president, of
course, suspected what was afoot (one reason why he was brought in) and within a short time the
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negotiator and senior person who tried to pull off this side arrangement were gone. The first
system-wide contract then took about another eight months to complete.3
In another case from the late 1980s when one of the authors was associated with a large
private university, the contract covering the law school faculty unit was traditionally negotiated
routinely over lunch in a favored Chinese restaurant. All was signed, sealed and delivered within
an hour. The opening position from the administration was: well, we might have to endeavor to
amend the collective bargaining unit and add law school faculty into the full-time faculty unit—a
proposal which was, of course, anathema to the law school faculty. The remainder of those
luncheons were then focused on wrapping up a quick deal. That was the same conversation, for
over a decade, and all on very good professional terms.
On the other side of the time fence, it is well known that one renewal contract negotiated
between the AAUP and the University of New Hampshire several years ago took almost three
years to finalize, including two rounds of fact-finding. By the time it was done, there was two
plus years of retroactive pay that had to be sorted out. But even longer was the initial contract at
Seminole State College in Florida, which, according to reports, took well over five years to
conclude!
These are, of course, mere anecdotes and unusual stories to illustrate that anything can
happen in negotiations, and in a world where the law does not dictate a fixed timeframe to
complete the process, the parties can create their own timeframe—from a handful of hours to
marathon events that would dwarf Hannibal’s long elephant march through the Alps!
But in the normal world of collective bargaining, what factors can we identify that affect
the length of time it takes to negotiate a faculty contract?
Initial Collective Bargaining Agreement: Influencing Factors
First of all, we must distinguish between first contracts and renewal agreements. As a
general rule, it takes infinitely longer to negotiate an initial faculty collective bargaining
agreement than it does with a renewal contract. While this may seem obvious, it is worth
underlining the reasons for the difference.

The one-page three-day “agreement in principle” remains in my treasured notebook, coffee
stains and all, hidden in my closet, it was important at the time. (DJ)
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The Importance of First Contract Language
Perhaps foremost on the list of special features of first-contract negotiations is the language
of the contract itself and, simply put, getting this right takes an inordinate amount of time. It is
axiomatic that the first contract is the most important in terms of contract language. Each side
starts with no language in place, not even a title page. And from this void, an agreement
governing the working conditions and compensation of hundreds of bargaining unit faculty must
be chiseled and shaped. Moreover, since the provisions of a union contract do not easily change
from one round to the next, the language that is negotiated into that first agreement is absolutely
critical, especially on the key areas of the contract such as grievance procedures, management
rights, standards of review for personnel decisions, and matters of academic judgment, to name a
few. In many cases, language negotiated 20 years earlier will still survive in subsequent contracts
without amendment. This is because of the burden in later rounds of making changes. The party
coming forward with language changes in any future round bears a practical burden of
persuasion, and gains that were hard fought in previous rounds will not be easily given back. For
example, the establishment in a first contract of a “just cause” protection for discipline and
discharge or the right to arbitrate grievances are provisions that are not likely to disappear in later
rounds, and any administrative effort to take them back is likely to fall on deaf ears.
Public-sector contracts are even more difficult to change from year to year due to the
absence of the right to strike (in many states) and the substitution of other devises to resolve
bargaining impasses. Under many public sector labor statutes, when impasse is reached, the
parties may proceed to advisory fact finding or even binding arbitration. These processes are
notoriously conservative, and most neutrals will not recommend wholesale changes in
fundamental contract language, thus making it more difficult for a moving party to alter original
contract provisions. None of this is absolute, of course, and language changes of some sort are
made in every round of bargaining. But on the fundamental core provisions set in that initial
round, the years only serve to cement their stature in the agreement.
For such reasons, first contracts take time to complete. With no language in place, with
skeptical and wary participants, and with all of the issues cited above, it is little wonder that the
negotiations of most first contracts take well over a year. As bargaining proceeds, the time itself
becomes a burden, taxing the schedules of the participants, the expenses of the institution, and
the patience of all. The ability to understand this reality early will help an institution cope with
the tedium, the frustration, and the periodic outbursts of tempers along the way.
With all these considerations, among many others, looming before an institution, it is easy
to understand the enormous pressures that weigh on a bargaining team and an administration as it
goes into first-round bargaining with any new bargaining unit.
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Developing the Relationship
For better or worse, the introduction of a union changes the relationship between faculty
and administration. The relationship is no longer bilateral but trilateral: the administration, the
faculty, and the union. The administration must adjust to having a new political and legal entity
on the campus with which it must deal on all matters affecting wages, hours, and working
conditions and, in many cases, permissive subjects of bargaining as well such as governance.
The adjustment takes time, but usually unions demand bargaining within weeks of their
certification and thus the building of the relationship will begin to develop while the parties are
in the midst of that first round of bargaining. This itself can slow down that first bargaining
round with each party, like Sumo wrestlers, eyeing the other cautiously around the ring.
First contracts, like treaties after a war, are often negotiated in strained and tense climates.
In the aftermath of a union campaign, what may be remembered first is that both sides may have
attacked the other in seeking votes. When the dust settles and the union has won, the
administration may still be angered at the results and not inclined to make life any easier for the
upstart labor organization. Unions, depending on their margin of victory, may come to the table
with the arrogance of success and a mandate to improve the lot of the unit members. Or at the
very least, they may come to the table determined to rectify the problems that led faculty to turn
to them in the first place.
Style and tone at the table, then, become critical elements in establishing the long-term
relationship between the parties. That relationship will evolve from the way the two sides relate
to one another during these early days and particularly how they conduct themselves at the
bargaining table. Factors such as the ferocity of each side’s rhetoric, the demeanor of the
negotiators, the nature of the proposals, the insistence on demands, the tone of the dialogue, and
the way the parties handle the side issues that occur while bargaining the initial agreement will
all take on particular meaning in that initial round.
For such reasons, it takes time for everyone to catch their breath after the union campaign
and decide how they want to approach each other—and that can slow down the process of
negotiating that first agreement.
Planning
The key to effective negotiations starts with effective planning. Never is this more
important than in the first contract negotiations and never does it take more time to do. In
addition to the normal bargaining preparation and data collection that accompanies every round,
the initial season at the table requires the development of a certain type of grand strategy and a
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delineation of essential goals and principles that will guide the team and the administration
through the months ahead. To accomplish this, an institution must set aside considerable periods
of time to define and refine this strategy and to sketch out a broad vision of the future.
As one example of this, administrators, in approaching an initial round of bargaining, will
first want to consider whether they will have a particular overall stance to the bargaining itself.
For example, will the administration simply seek to preserve the status quo and prevent the union
from encroaching too much on management prerogatives? If so, it will be on the defensive most
of the time, seeking to avoid substantive change wherever possible.
On the other hand, the administration may pursue a more aggressive approach and propose
major changes in the status quo. First contract negotiations may be seen as an opportunity to
address problems of performance, productivity, governance, or economics that may not have
been dealt with effectively in other settings4 An administration adopting this approach will be
formulating major initiatives to present at the table—and these will take considerable time to
deal with at the table.
Beyond the broad picture, the administration will turn to particular themes and principles in
preparing for bargaining. These can include many different concepts that vary depending on the
nature of the bargaining unit. With a full-time faculty unit, concerns may extend to establishing
or maintaining sound evaluation procedures, focusing on language that will enhance academic
quality, defining the legitimate lines of governance, and restricting matters of academic judgment
from arbitral review. With part-time faculty, the focus may be on keeping costs low, avoiding the
extension of major benefits, and maintaining control of assignments as much as possible.
With every bargaining unit, then, there will be special institutional aims that can be
developed into operating principles in addressing many of the issues at the table. They will
constitute the broad priorities as well as the reasoned underpinnings of the administration’s
approach in the months ahead. This kind of planning neither seeks to define every piece of
contract language with precision, nor does it set forth fixed tactics that must be followed week to
week. Such matters should be left instead to the negotiators, who must be responsive to what the
other side is doing, what circumstances develop, and what opportunities emerge. Instead, this
pre-negotiations work on goals and principles can be important grounding for the institution and

4

As one recent example of this, the wave of new adjunct faculty bargaining units in the past few years has resulted
in administrations, often for the first time, examining the method by which adjuncts are evaluated and realizing that
there was often no clear oversight of the adjuncts’ performance. Thus, at the bargaining table, colleges and
universities are themselves proposing more detailed and thoughtful evaluations procedures where none had
previously existed.
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can provide guidance on any particular issue. As the bargaining proceeds, it will be useful to
refer to these principles periodically to make sure everyone is staying close to the charted course.
Finally, the administration has to consider what it is willing to discuss at the table. While
an administration is required to negotiate over wages, hours and working conditions under the
National Labor Relations Act and virtually all public sector statutes, other issues of vital concern
to faculty—such as governance issues—may be only permissive subjects of bargaining. This
does not mean the administration is precluded from discussing those topics, but it does mean that
it has to decide whether it wants to wade into those waters as part of the bargaining process. In
addition, while an employer can always bail out of discussing permissive subjects in future
rounds, the reality of the relationship is that if the administration discusses a permissive subject
in the first round of bargaining, it will be hard pressed to extricate itself from such discussions in
the next round.
Data Collection
The collection of data and information for collective bargaining is a time-consuming but
necessary task. While this is true in every round of bargaining, first contracts are particularly
difficult because there are often no templates in place to serve as a guide for obtaining the data.
The administration has to figure out which department will be in charge of producing what
information. What will the role of the Provost’s office be? Human Resources? Institutional
Research? Academic Departments? Who will be responsible for what?
Also, in many cases involving first contracts for adjunct faculty units, for example,
administrations are not even sure who is in the unit or what information they have on such unit
members, due to localized hiring of adjuncts by department chairs. In a first round of bargaining,
just getting the information gathered is time consuming. This requires time-consuming
questioning of the individual departments, the usual locus for such information.
First Considerations at the Table: The Establishment of Initial Ground Rules
Once the teams are at the table, where do you start? The very first consideration should be
ground rules. Ground rules are sometimes not even considered as the parties approach
bargaining, but they can be indispensable to a smooth first contract round and indeed for all
subsequent rounds of negotiations. They establish, along with the legal framework, the rules by
which the parties will play, and, once established in the first round, they often continue without
major changes for future rounds. Thus, the first round again becomes an important test period
and pinning down satisfactory ground rules can also take considerable time.
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Among the many items to be considered here include:


Time lines for submission of initial proposals and possibly time lines for either reaching
an agreement or reaching impasse;



The location of the meetings and frequency and times of meetings;



The number of people on each team;



Identification of the chief spokesperson;



Provisions for communications between the parties between sessions;



Understandings that articles may be T/A’d (tentative agreements) ;



Provision that nothing goes into effect until contract is ratified by both sides;



Provisions regarding who may or may not attend bargaining sessions;



Whether or not there will be any restrictions on press releases or other public
statements about the bargaining; prior notice to the other side if one side or the other
plans a press release and similar provisions;



Release time, with or without pay, for employees participating in bargaining;



Agreement to set agenda of an upcoming meeting at close of any given meeting;



Provisions as to the number of copies when materials are exchanged;



Sharing of expenses if bargaining takes place off-campus at hotel or other rented
facilities;



General principles of civility and good faith to govern the bargaining affirmed by each
side;



Understandings with regard to data requests;



Provisions for changing the rules by agreement.

Once such ground rules are negotiating for a first agreement, they often simply get rubber
stamped for future rounds. But again, for a first round, these take time. In summary and
considering all of the factors above, it is little wonder that first contracts almost invariably take
more than a year to negotiate under the best of conditions, and, coupled with some of the factors
to be cited below, the process can easily span 18 or more months.
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Subsequent Rounds of Bargaining: Influencing Factors
Collective bargaining, especially with faculty units, is never easy, but subsequent rounds of
bargaining are uniformly less difficult and less time-consuming than first rounds. In subsequent
rounds, the parties have come to know each other. Each side knows the style of the other side,
the people who will tend to guide the process, and the general approach and demeanor of the
other side. In other words, the relationship has been formed, at least initially.
Details such as ground rules require less time. Often previous ground rules are adopted
with no changes, or perhaps only a tweak or two. Data collection has become more routine, with
appropriate offices involved in the collection of particular data. The parties may have already
established a timetable, either informally or in that first contract, as to when the renewal
negotiations will start. Everything is simply more established.
According to recent informal polling among higher education administrators who actually
sit at bargaining tables, contract renewals usually take between four and ten months, with a
number of rounds taking a year or more. It is typical at most institutions that bargaining will
begin in January for contracts expiring in the summer, or some similar time frame. And yet, there
can still be great variation in the time it takes to negotiate a successor contract. Why is this the
case?
Certainly, we can identify a series of factors that can, and do, directly influence the length
of time it takes to negotiate a successor collective bargaining agreement. These include:
The Adopted Style of Negotiations: Positional v. Interest Based
As is well known, the two styles of bargaining normally in play are traditional positional
bargaining and interest-based bargaining, with variations in between. This essay will not debate
the two approaches except to underline that interest-based bargaining, if done correctly, will
usually take much longer to negotiate than positional negotiations. This is due primarily to the
need to confront every issue raised by each side (as opposed to simply saying no to a proposal)
and, when so confronting an issue, allowing for brainstorming of ideas, various suggested
options to deal with the issue, then measured against agreed upon criteria, and so on. Such a
process is not designed for those who want to limit the time devoted to collective bargaining in a
given year.
Frequency of Meeting Times
This is an obvious factor. Parties meeting once a week will get the work done quicker than
those meeting once or twice a month.
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Public Versus Private: the Statutory Framework.
Here there is a tremendous difference between the private and public sector. In the private
sector, under the umbrella of the National Labor Relations Act, either negotiations concludes
with a settlement (perhaps with the help of a mediator) or there may be a strike. In contrast,
public sector negotiations take place within a statutory framework where strikes may be
prohibited and, instead, there are lengthy impasse procedures when the parties get stuck. For
example, many state statutes provide that if negotiations fail, then a mediator must be appointed
to assist and, if the parties still do not reach closure, then they proceed to advisory fact finding.
This process can take months, as the fact finder must be first mutually agreed upon; a hearing
date or dates must be set; briefs must be filed and decisions rendered. This process alone can
easily take six months. Beyond that, in some sectors, there are steps beyond advisory fact
finding, such as last best offers, that must be followed.5 In the public sector, then, such processes
can drive a normal bargaining process well into a second year or more.
Size and Composition of the Bargaining Team
For example, the Service Employees International Union, in its recent surge of activity in
organizing adjuncts and other contingent faculty in the Boston area would routinely have
bargaining teams of 25 or more faculty at the sessions, each with the ability to participate.
Inevitably, this delays the process as more individuals find the necessity to speak. This is
opposed to tightly circumscribed union bargaining teams of five or six faculty members with a
chief spokesperson. While smaller teams may not mean a quicker pace any more than large ones
slow it down, the number of people involved in the process can be a factor.
The Subjects on the Table
Certainly, a bargaining round with an abundance of complex issues will inevitably take
longer to negotiate whereas limited-scope bargaining, under which the parties agree in advance
to limit the number of articles to be opened or the number of issues to be raised can expedite the
process. When both sides want to avoid an excessively long bargaining season, they may mutual
agree to follow this approach.

5

In Vermont, following fact finding, each party must submit, as a single package, its last best offer on all disputed
items to the Vermont Labor Relations Board who must then pick either the union’s package taken as a whole with
no amendments, or the administration’s package, taken as a whole with no amendments. 3 V.S.A. Section 901 et
seq.
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Parties Control over the Subjects
Further complicating the negotiations may be the degree to which the parties control—or
don’t control—the resolution of the issues. Some issues at the table may be beyond the authority
of the team and rest instead on external agencies. For example, in the public sector, does the state
legislature control or otherwise have to approve financial packages, or does the institution have
the autonomy to chart its own course? Where the state controls, the parties may reach some
tentative understandings, but the state legislature may take months to ratify or appropriate the
money to fund the agreement.
The Nature of the Bargaining Unit and Degree of Conflict or Cooperation Among Primary
Constituencies in the Unit
This can be an issue when the unit is particularly broad, such as when there is a mixture of
tenured/tenure-track faculty mingled with non-tenure track, contingent faculty. The views of one
group may not mirror the views of other groups. Indeed, a classic example of this is the desire of
many full-time faculty unions to limit the number of part-time or otherwise contingent faculty at
the institution. When the unit includes both contingent faculty and tenured faculty, the interests
of the two groups can be in conflict, creating delays. A problem can also occur in a multi-campus
system where negotiators are trying to take into account the particular interests and needs of the
different campuses. The relationship of “local power brokers” to system decision makers often
proves to be determinative;
The Relationship of Local Union Representatives to National Representatives
At times, the relationship between local and state/national union officials can affect a
number of issues. The best interests of one may not mesh with the best interests of the other. For
example, an aggressive national union may insist on certain provisions for the local agreement—
such as a union shop—that may hamper the ability of the local union to complete negotiations.
The Agenda of Negotiator, Administration, or Union
This is broader than the particular proposals on the table. For labor, this may depend on
why and in what manner the union agent was elected in the first place. For example, the primary
impetus may be to act as a hedge against what was perceived as arbitrary and high-handed
management actions, as a way to safeguard gains made prior to unionization and which may now
be perceived to be in jeopardy. or as a defense against system-wide incursion into local affairs. Is
this a situation where one agent challenges another, and wins an election, and must now
demonstrate greater prowess at the table to a “new” membership? On the management side, an

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol8/iss1/6
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1649

10

Julius and DiGiovanni: Factors That Effect Time to Negotiate a Faculty CBA

administration may have an aggressive agenda that it knows it won’t achieve at the table but
plans to assert during the impasse proceedings.
The Lead Negotiator
In some cases, the lead negotiator becomes the problem in terms of the time it takes to
negotiate. A new negotiator for one side or the other may enter the round of bargaining seeking
to undo what his or her predecessor did at the table. A new union leader may think that the
previous union negotiator was too soft, or too compliant with the administration’s wishes and
may now seek to assert the union’s agenda in an aggressive fashion that forces the parties into
impasse and slows down the process.
On the other hand, a thoughtful and experienced negotiator may become an asset in moving
the process along, counseling his or her side to make reasonable responses to the other side’s
needs, achieving fair compromises and finding ways to settle issues that may have seemed
impossible to resolve.
The Economic Climate
Bargaining in tight economic times is a challenge and can often elongate the process. A
union facing a management position of either no compensation increases or maybe a 1%
increase, for example, will have no incentive to settle quickly and, in the public sector, may
simply decide to move into the longer statutory impasse procedures.
The Relative Strength of the Unit
A unit of tenured/tenure-track faculty generally holds more sway than newly formed units
of adjunct faculty. Administrations may be more concerned about their full-time tenure-stream
faculty and be willing to engage in longer negotiations over more issues than it might with
contingent faculty. However, the current climate, where adjuncts and full-time contingent faculty
units are numerous and developing into a force, may eventually change that equation.
The Ability of the President or the Board of Trustees to Sustain Conflict with the Union,
with Internal Constituencies, or to Survive “Negative Press”
Simply put, some administrations and boards of trustees are willing to weather a long siege
to maintain their position and not yield to union demands. Others may eventually not want the
distraction of an unresolved contract and will fold on issues at some point just to get the process
over with. This can also include the relationship of the president to his or her senior leadership
team and generally whether the president is secure or feels at risk.
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Continuity, or Lack Thereof, of Administrators
It sometimes is the case that a new president, or provost, is hired in the middle of a round
of bargaining. The new administrator may have sharply different views from his or her
predecessor, and, depending on what those views are and how they contrast with the previous
administration, the negotiating process can be suddenly cut short through concessions or
elongated through defiance.
Additional factors include:


The degree to which settlement will advance the career of one individual or another or
advance the interests of a particular constituency;



The degree to which one party or the other needs or desires to test the strength of the
other;



What other agreements unions in the area or region have made and whether pattern
bargaining plays a role and how much support the bargaining union will receive from
other unions on campus;



The process for contract ratification;



Luck, serendipity, time of year, and the health of individuals at the table;



The extent to which one party feels coming to agreement may hurt institutional prestige
or set a pattern for other institutions (a city or region).

The list above is fairly comprehensive, and yet, we would be hard pressed to answer a
question concerning in what manner these factors and variables shorten or extend the length of
negotiations. For example, the experience of the negotiator, size and composition of bargaining
teams, the authority of negotiators all matter but to what extent? An experienced negotiator will
know under what conditions settlement is possible but may be prevented from doing so by other
variables identified in this essay. Research is needed in post-secondary settings on the effect of
personality, organizational, political or structural variables that impact negotiations in a
“positive” or “negative” manner assuming anyone can come to an agreement on the definition of
those terms.
While first contracts invariably take longer to negotiate, successor agreements can be as
problematic as first-time contracts. For example, if the parties are confined to economic items
only, there may be less opportunity to trade non-economic issues for economics and vice versa.
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By and large, it is sometimes easier, in our experience, to have both economic and non-economic
issues on the table; the art of negotiations demands that tradeoffs be made (or at least feigned).
Moreover, there are strategies negotiators employ to enhance leverage which may make
negotiations for successor agreements an easier or more difficult affair. For example, inserting
language that mandates arbitration procedures expire, let’s say a month before the actual
agreement terminates, can, in some jurisdictions leave one party without recourse to arbitration
until a new contract is agreed upon and ratified. A situation such as this can, in some cases, cause
pressure to settle, as can a strike or a lockout. There are other ways to enhance leverage and such
strategies require sophistication and a knowledgeable “long- term view” of negotiations
processes.
While legal and organizational environments differ, and the politics of organizations and
personalities of leaders are always interesting, we would argue the private sector affords
employer representatives with greater legal flexibility and leverage in negotiations. Whether or
not the negotiators take advantage of that leverage is another story, and sometimes it may not be
wise to take advantage of such. There is an old adage, that good legal advice may not be good
academic advice. While a party can triumph at the bargaining table through a strike or lockout,
negative press, attitudes of students, and public opinion often leave deep institutional scars.
Animosity resulting from a strike or lockout may last for years, ripping the fabric of the
academic community and replacing civility with cynicism and anger.
Ultimately, students suffer, and the institution has a much harder time recruiting talented
faculty and staff. In our experience the next president after such actions occur will inevitably be
asked to start anew with a different team. In academic organizations, as in other highly political
contexts, the heroes of a strategy that lead to particular outcomes in one era, may be scapegoated
over time, when the unintended consequences of labor relations actions are then blamed on those
who were given accolades and credit for what originally transpired. Bargaining is a cyclical
process, and one would do well to approach it with caution, foresight, and a long-term view
about bargaining gains and losses. This is true for union as well as employer representatives.
The truth is that regardless of negotiating positions and bargaining outcomes, in academic
organizations the parties must still engage in shared governance of some kind in post-bargaining
relationships. Conditions that pre-dated bargaining can be exacerbated if negotiations and
settlements are not addressed in an effective, respectful, and fair manner. After the ratification
vote, the parties have to live with each other again; trust and respect must be nourished. In this
regard, labor relations dynamics in colleges and universities really are different than in many
other industries and organizations.
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The appended charts depict the dimensions of negotiations. They provide some insight into
why the process can sometimes drag on for months and even years. Charts 1 through 66 depict
the dimensions of labor relations and constituents who impact collective bargaining processes
and outcomes. Knowing the “dimensions” is a sina qua non for understanding how the process is
influenced and, as well, the impact of the variables identified which are associated with the
length of negotiation processes.
Imperatives on Negotiators to Manage the Process
As good practitioners we conclude this essay by providing readers with questions they
might consider as they “manage “or navigate the negotiations process. One caveat is clear; those
who negotiate must prepare their team, constituencies, and the senior leadership for what will
transpire at the bargaining table. Presidents need information and need to be prepared to respond
when trustees, legislators, or community leaders ask why the institution cannot settle with the
union. In worst case scenarios, senior academic leaders, including the president, look inept and
unattached to reality (and because of this, lose authority and prestige) when they are unable to
respond intelligently to important internal or external constituencies on the question of the length
of negotiations. We have witnessed cases where important external stakeholders lost faith in
internal leaders because they did not understand negotiation strategies and tactics and instead
perceived the process to be adrift. We count among our friends chief negotiators who lost their
positions by failing to provide the information and evidence that the negotiating process was
being managed correctly; all of which is related to the question of the length of negotiations.
Explaining contract negotiations and the variables and factors that effect negotiations to
presidents or chancellors or faculty constituencies, who may be asking for a rational approach
and a realistic timeframe to wrap up negotiations, is imperative for chief spokespersons who seek
a long career and the ability to retain the power and influence needed to be effective.
Our experience suggests that bargaining is still dependent on a multiplicity of variables and
factors. Knowing which ones are most salient will help determine answers to the original
questions which generated this essay; which, by the way, is still, “it depends.”

6

The appended charts, Dimensions of Collective Bargaining, were, to the best of our knowledge, originally
developed for training programs by the U.S. Department of Labor in the 1940’s or 1950’s. We have adapted them
for use in higher education and have been using them since the 1970’s. They were most recently published in D.
Julius and N. DiGiovanni, “Academic Collective Bargaining: On Campus Fifty Years “Center for Studies in Higher
Education, Research and Occasional Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, April 2013.
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